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Evolution, Science, and Ideology:
Why the Establishment Clause Requires
Neutrality in Science Classes
Stephen W. Trask*
INTRODUCTION
Public education is often considered to be one of the most benign aspects of state power. Many people question how such a
benevolent institution could be labeled as coercive when it rarely
even engages in corporal punishment. It is the dominance of this
assumption in society that allows compulsory public education to
conceal its considerable coercive power. The source of this power
is the inherent capacity of public education to shape how students view the world. Both the public education system and the
elites who influence it use this power to serve their own ideological ends. One of the best examples of this ideological coercion is
the choice of public schools to teach evolutionary theory as the
exclusive explanation for the origin of life. Both public schools
and federal courts justify the failure to teach alternatives with
the claim that evolutionism is the only scientific explanation for
the origin of life. In reality, alternatives to evolutionary theory
are only unscientific to the extent that one relies on a secular
definition of the scientific method. Relying on a slanted definition of science will inevitably produce a rigged game when one
determines whether a theory is scientific.
Although some school districts and legislatures have attempted to solve this problem, the federal courts have used the
Establishment Clause to obstruct all attempts at reform. The
underlying cause of this situation is both philosophical and legal.
Flawed epistemological assumptions have produced flawed legal
reasoning. Because the problem has two sources, the solution
must also have two aspects. First, people should recognize that
the definition of science, which is legitimizing the exclusion of alternatives to evolutionary theory, is ideological. Second, the U.S.
Supreme Court should hold that the failure to teach alternatives
* J.D. 2006, William Mitchell College of Law; B.S. 2003, Liberty University. I would
like to thank Professor Russell Pannier, Jeremy Samek, and Josiah Neeley for assisting
with this article.
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to evolutionary theory in public school science classes is an establishment of religion under the First Amendment. Section I of
this paper will analyze the false epistemological assumptions
that are legitimizing the indoctrination of students into evolutionary theory. Section II will examine Establishment Clause
cases that have dealt with evolutionism. Section III will discuss
why the exclusive teaching of evolutionism in public schools violates the Establishment Clause.
I. UNMASKING SECULAR HUMANISM
Nearly all public schools teach evolutionism without incorporating alternatives to evolutionism into the curriculum.1 In order
to address the legal errors that have produced this situation, it is
first necessary to address the epistemological errors that are justifying the exclusion of alternatives to evolutionary theory from
public school science classes. Some late twentieth-century philosophers examined the role that knowledge can play in justifying the exclusion of non-conforming belief systems. An exploration of the thought of these philosophers will offer some insight
into the logic that has legitimized the exclusion of alternatives to
evolutionism.
The search for truth is not always an objective inquiry. Michel Foucault has argued:
If we truly wish to know knowledge . . . we must look not to philosophers but to politicians—we need to understand what the relations of
struggle and power are. One can understand what knowledge consists
of only by examining these relations of struggle and power, the manner in which things and men hate one another, fight one another, and
try to dominate one another, to exercise power relations over one another.2

The search for truth is not always an innocent pursuit; it can also
be a power struggle. The ability to determine what truth is can
place a person or group of people in a position of social dominance. According to Foucault, every society has a politics of
truth, which determines what forms of discourse will be accepted
1 See McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
The Biological Sciences Curriculum Study (BSCS) . . . . developed a series of biology texts which, although emphasizing different aspects of biology, incorporated the theory of evolution as a major theme. The success of the BSCS effort
is shown by the fact that fifty percent of American school children currently
use BSCS books directly and the curriculum is incorporated indirectly in virtually all biology texts.

Id.

2 3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth and Juridical Forms, in THE ESSENTIAL WORKS OF
FOUCAULT 1954–1984: POWER 1, 12 (Paul Rainbow & James D. Faubion eds., Robert Hurley et al. trans., The New Press 2000) (1994).
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as truth.3 This politics of truth includes the methods that people
will use to define truth and what people will be responsible for
making determinations concerning the nature of truth.4 This
politics of truth that exists in a society at any given time is not
something that the state must enforce, since embedded power relations in culture “permeate the whole fabric of our existence.”5
Power is not always bad, but it is always dangerous, and it is important to understand the world through cautious investigation
that takes into account the dangers of truth and power.6
Logical Positivism, an early twentieth-century philosophical
movement, strongly influenced the epistemological methods that
exist in the scientific community today.7 A.J. Ayer was probably
the best-known proponent of Logical Positivism. He argued that
in order for a statement to be meaningful, it must be verifiable.8
The necessary condition of whether a statement is factually significant is whether some observation could affirm or deny the
truth of the statement.9
We enquire in every case what observations would lead us to answer
the question, one way or the other; and, if none can be discovered, we
must conclude that the sentence under consideration does not, as far
as we are concerned, express a genuine question, however strongly its
grammatical appearance may suggest that it does.10

Therefore, under Ayer’s definition of science, a statement
that refers to the “purposeful complexity of the universe as evidence for the existence of God” would be an incoherent statement
since no possible observation could directly affirm or deny the existence of God.11
Jean-François Lyotard has written about the role that the
3 See 3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth and Power, in THE ESSENTIAL WORKS OF
FOUCAULT 1954–1984: POWER, supra note 2, at 111, 131.
Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth—that is, the
types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and
instances that enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means
by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in
the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what
counts as true.
Id.
4 Id.
5 FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 17.
6 See Colin Gordon, Introduction to 3 THE ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT 1954–
1984: POWER, supra note 2, at xi, xix.
7 See infra notes 63–64, 137–144 and accompanying text.
8 ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH & LOGIC 35 (Dover Publications 1952)
(1936).
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 115 (“For to say that ‘God exists’ is to make a metaphysical utterance which
cannot be either true or false. And by the same criterion, no sentence which purports to
describe the nature of a transcendent god can possess any literal significance.”).
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scientific epistemology can play in legitimizing exclusion. He argues that scientific epistemologies are language games12 since
there are rules or constraints that establish what forms of discourse a person can use in the process of fulfilling the requirements of the game.13 The dominant definition of science in the
scientific community is such a language game because it establishes the rules or constraints that one must follow to arrive at
truth.14 Science is simply descriptive statements that are limited
by two constraints15: the descriptive statements must be open to
explicit observation, and they must be subject to review by scientific experts.16
Scientific epistemologies, like Logical Positivism, legitimize
the exclusion of those who do not understand truth exclusively
through empirical verification. “The scientist questions the validity of narrative statements and concludes that they are never
subject to argumentation or proof. He classifies them as belonging to a different mentality: savage, primitive, underdeveloped,
backward, alienated, composed of opinions, customs, authority,
prejudice, ignorance, ideology.”17 The state excludes any theory
that has a supernatural element under the assumption that such
statements must inevitably rely on subjective faith instead of objective proof.18 Therefore, those who do not define truth exclu12 See JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE 3, 9–11 (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minnesota
Press 1984) (1979).
13 Id. at 10.
Wittgenstein . . . focuses his attention on the effects of different modes of discourse; he calls the various types of utterances he identifies along the
way . . . language games. . . . [E]ach of the various categories of utterance can
be defined in terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which
they can be put—in exactly the same way as the game of chess is defined by a
set of rules determining the properties of each of the pieces, in other words, the
proper way to move them.
Id. Wittgenstein gave these linguistics the title “language games,” and Lyotard developed
the idea further, applying it to scientific epistemologies.
14 Id. at 18 (Science is “composed of denotative statements, but imposes two supplementary conditions on their acceptability: the objects to which they refer must be available . . . in explicit conditions of observation; and it must be possible to decide whether or
not a given statement pertains to the language judged relevant by the experts.”). Id. at 24
(“These two rules underlie what nineteenth-century science calls verification and twentieth-century science, falsification.”).
15 Id. at 18.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 27.
18 Introduction to CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, at xx–xxi (Michael
W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001) (“A second source of the resistance, we think, is a throwback to the modern or ‘scientific’ period of legal thought. . . . Religion is subjective, and
science is objective.”); Iain T. Benson, Notes Towards a (Re)Definition of the “Secular”, 33
U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 519, 520 (2000).
The term ‘secular’ has come to mean a realm that is neutral or, more precisely,
‘religion-free.’ Implicit in this religion free neutrality is the notion that the
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sively through the process of scientific verification often experience marginalization.
The hegemony of scientific knowledge production becomes
even more problematic given that this form of knowledge requires as much faith as belief in the supernatural. Lyotard argues that science is facing a major crisis of legitimation because
of epistemological problems that result from its inability to demonstrate the legitimacy of its method.19 Two problems would result if science attempted to legitimize itself. First, it would rely
on circular reasoning, which would violate the very principles
that govern rational inquiry in the scientific discipline.20 Second,
science cannot prove through the senses alone that all true
knowledge must be directly accessible to the senses since, if there
were either forms of knowledge or elements of reality that were
inaccessible to the senses, the senses, by definition, would be unable to detect those forms of knowledge or elements of reality.21
Therefore, since science cannot confer legitimacy upon itself, it is
inevitable that science will seek legitimation using narrative
knowledge.22 It will seek to tell the epic stories of scientific discoveries in order to confer legitimacy on its method.23 However,
the problem with using narrative as a function of legitimation is
that the foundation of science becomes a form of knowledge that
science believes is inferior, backward, and worthless.24 The scientific epistemology is slowly collapsing under its own unconditional demands for proof. The positivistic view of the scientific
secular is a realm of facts distinct from the realm of faith. . . . States cannot be
neutral towards metaphysical claims. Their very inaction towards certain
claims operates as an affirmation of others. . . . The often anti-religious stance
embodied in secularism excludes and banishes religion from any practical place
in culture.
Id. The term “faith” refers to a belief that does not rely on proof.
19 LYOTARD, supra note 12, at 27–28.
Before it came to this point (what some call positivism), scientific knowledge
sought other solutions. It is remarkable that for a long time it could not help
resorting for its solutions to procedures that, overtly or not, belong to narrative
knowledge. . . . It is not inconceivable that the recourse to narrative is inevitable, at least to the extent that the language game of science desires its statements to be true but does not have the resources to legitimate their truth on its
own.
Id.
20 Id. at 29 (“Without such recourse it would be in the position of presupposing its
own validity and would be stooping to what it condemns: begging the question, proceeding
on prejudice.”).
21 See id. (“It is recognized that the conditions of truth, in other words, the rules of
the game of science, are immanent in that game . . . .”).
22 Id. The term “narrative knowledge” refers to a belief that does not rely on proof.
23 Id. at 28.
24 Id. at 29 (“Scientific knowledge cannot know and make known that it is the true
knowledge without resorting to the other, narrative, kind of knowledge, which from its
point of view is no knowledge at all.”).
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method is a faith-based principle.
Some practical implications for science classes emanate from
these philosophical principles. The object of study in science
classes should be anything in the universe that a person can
study through the five senses. Therefore, revealed texts in which
some people find authority are not within the realm of scientific
study. This is not because such religious texts are necessarily inferior to scientific study—they are just two different topical areas
of study. This does not mean that science classes can exclude
any idea relating to the supernatural. There are two possible
approaches to the scientific method. One studies reality through
the senses in both approaches. The point of tension between the
two methods concerns what inferences one can draw from sensory experience. The materialistic approach (Logical Positivism)
to the scientific method would not allow a person to infer supernatural explanations from the sensible world.
The nonmaterialistic approach to the scientific method would allow a
person to infer supernatural explanations from sensory experience. Science classes should teach students about both of these
approaches to the scientific method because neither has a superior claim to proof and both entail faith.25
The current indoctrination in science classes is the result of
a failure to teach both approaches.26 Public schools and the
courts have argued that the materialistic scientific method is the
only scientific method.27 When one operates under this assumption, the exclusion of alternatives to evolutionary theory from the
curriculum becomes inevitable since only theories that are exclusively materialistic in their inferences are legitimate scientific
theories. Other explanations relating to the origin of life are excluded, by definition, since these theories include supernatural
inferences about the material world. As was previously discussed, both of these methods require faith. However, public
schools and the courts arbitrarily exclude and indoctrinate people
who subscribe to the non-materialistic scientific method.28 Only
recognition of the faith-based assumptions inherent in each of
See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text.
See Benson, supra note 18, at 520 (“[A] properly constituted secular government
(non-sectarian not non-faith) will see as necessary the due accommodation of religiously
informed beliefs from a variety of cultures.”).
27 See, e.g., McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1267–68, 1272 (E.D.
Ark. 1982); Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 735–38 (M.D. Pa.
2005).
28 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 589 (1987); McLean, 529 F. Supp. at
1267–68, 1272; Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 346–48 (5th Cir.
1999); Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735–38; Wright v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 366 F.
Supp. 1208, 1210–11 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d
517, 521–22 (9th Cir. 1994).
25
26
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these methodologies will end the ideological exclusion and oppression.29
The ultimate implication of exclusively teaching the materialistic approach to the scientific method is that the state is forcibly indoctrinating students into the religion of secular humanism. According to the Council for Secular Humanism, “Secular
humanism . . . is a philosophy and world view which centers upon
human concerns and employs rational and scientific methods to
address the wide range of issues important to us all.”30 Elements
of the secular humanist belief system include: use of reason and
science to understand the universe and solve problems,31 discouraging supernatural understandings of reality,32 protecting
the Earth for the good of other species and future generations,33
skepticism toward untested knowledge,34 belief in common moral
decency,35 separation of church and state,36 belief in agnosticism
or atheism,37 belief in naturalism (i.e., no supernatural realm),38
belief that evolutionary theory is strongly supported by the evidence,39 and opposition to creationism in science classes.40 The
beliefs of the religion of secular humanism emerge logically and
29 Benson, supra note 18, at 521 (“What can advertise itself as neutral is often anything but . . . . Until the necessarily ‘implicit faiths’ are acknowledged, explicit faiths are
at a marked disadvantage in finding any place in the public sphere, including: politics,
public education, and law itself.”).
30 Council
for
Secular
Humanism,
What
is
Secular
Humanism?,
http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=main&page=what (last visited Oct.
2, 2006).
31 Council for Secular Humanism, The Affirmations of Humanism: A Statement of
Principles, http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=main&page=affirmations
(last visited Oct. 2, 2006) (“We are committed to the application of reason and science to
the understanding of the universe and to the solving of human problems.”).
32 Id. (“We deplore efforts to denigrate human intelligence, to seek to explain the
world in supernatural terms, and to look outside nature for salvation.”).
33 Id. (“We want to protect and enhance the earth, to preserve it for future generations, and to avoid inflicting needless suffering on other species.”).
34 Id. (“We are skeptical of untested claims to knowledge . . . .”).
35 Id. (“We believe in the common moral decencies: altruism, integrity, honesty,
truthfulness, responsibility. Humanist ethics is amenable to critical, rational guidance.
There are normative standards that we discover together. Moral principles are tested by
their consequences.”).
36 Id. (“We are committed to the principle of the separation of church and state.”).
37 Council for Secular Humanism, supra note 30 (“Secular humanists are generally
nontheists. They typically describe themselves as nonreligious.”).
38 Id. (“Secular humanists accept a world view or philosophy called naturalism, in
which the physical laws of the universe are not superseded by non-material or supernatural entities . . . .”).
39 PAUL KURTZ, A SECULAR HUMANIST DECLARATION 21 (1980), (“[E]volution of the
species is supported so strongly by the weight of evidence that it is difficult to reject it.”).
40 Id. (“[W]e deplore the efforts by fundamentalists (especially in the United States)
to invade the science classrooms, requiring that creationist theory be taught to students
and requiring that it be included in biology textbooks.”). This is particularly interesting
since secular humanists apparently want to mix their religious beliefs with politics, and,
more specifically, to prohibit the teaching of other religious beliefs that conflict with their
religious beliefs.
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necessarily from the materialistic scientific method.41
II. CURRENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LAW ON EVOLUTION
A. Epperson v. Arkansas
In 1968, the Supreme Court heard the case Epperson v. Arkansas, which was its first Establishment Clause case dealing
with evolutionism.42 A 1928 Arkansas statute prohibited Arkansas public schools and universities from teaching the theory that
people evolved from other species.43 The Arkansas statute was a
product of religious fundamentalist opposition to evolutionism in
the 1920s.44 The statute modeled the Tennessee law that was the
subject of the famous Scopes case.45 The Court held that the
statute violated the “constitutional prohibition of state laws respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”46 The Arkansas law prohibited one scientific theory
out of the entire scientific discipline because the law conflicted
with a religious group’s interpretation of Genesis.47 “The First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion
and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.”48 The Arkansas law failed the neutrality standard because it did not prohibit all teaching concerning the origin of life.49 Instead, the law
targeted a specific theory that conflicted with the Bible.50
B. McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education
In 1982, the Federal District Court in the Eastern District of
Arkansas heard the case McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, which dealt with a recently passed Arkansas act that required public schools to give equal treatment to creation science
and evolution science.51 The major issue in this case was
whether the act violated the Establishment Clause,52 and the
court applied the Lemon Test to make this determination.53 The
Lemon Test has the following three prongs: “First, the statute
41 A.J. Ayer endorsed the Secular Humanist Declaration that the Council for Secular
Humanism issued in 1980. Id. at 28. This provides strong evidence for the link between
logical positivism and secular humanism.
42 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
43 Id. at 98.
44 Id.
45 Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (1927); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 98.
46 Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 104.
49 Id. at 109.
50 Id.
51 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1256 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
52 Id. at 1257.
53 Id. at 1258.
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must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”54 If any of these prongs is not
satisfied, the law in question is unconstitutional.55
The court first held that the act violated the secular purpose
prong of the Lemon Test.56 Deference must be given to the legislative purpose contained within an act, but this situation demanded attention to the historical context in which the act was
implemented.57 The court looked at the legislative history of the
act, including statements of people who supported the legislation,
and found that its purpose was sectarian and not educational.58
The act was nothing more than an attempt to introduce the Biblical version of creation into the science curriculum.59
The court also concluded from the language of the act that its
purpose and effect was to advance religion.60 The definition of
creationism used within the act implicitly referred to Genesis,
since it mentioned sudden creation out of nothing and a worldwide flood.61 The court concluded that the concept of creation out
of nothing is necessarily a religious concept,62 and the major effect of the act would be to advance religious beliefs because of its
correlation with the Genesis account.63
The court next concluded that the act could not have any
educational purpose because creation science was not science as
accepted by the scientific community.64 The court held that “the
essential characteristics of science are: (1) It is guided by natural
law; (2) It has to be explanatory by reference to natural law; (3) It
is testable against the empirical world; (4) Its conclusions are
tentative, i.e., are not necessarily the final word; and (5) It is falsifiable.”65 The concept of a sudden creation out of nothing fits
none of these characteristics of science.66 In addition, at the time
the case was decided, not one recognized scientific journal had

54 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (citations omitted) (quoting
Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
55 McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1258.
56 Id. at 1264.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1265–66.
63 Id. at 1266.
64 Id. at 1267.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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published an article on creation theory.67 The court did not believe that “such a loose knit group of independent thinkers in all
the varied fields of science could, or would, so effectively censor
new scientific thought.”68 The act also violated the advancement
of religion prong of the Lemon Test, since if creation science was
not science, the only effect of the act would be to advance religion.69
The McLean opinion could not be a better example of how
the materialistic approach to the scientific method legitimizes
the exclusion of alternatives to evolution science, such as creation
science, from class curriculum. The court’s appeal to the dominance of the materialistic approach to the scientific method in
the scientific community only serves to demonstrate the central
thesis of Lyotard70:
[T]he conditions of truth, in other words, the rules of the game of science, are immanent in that game, . . . they can only be established
within the bonds of a debate that is already scientific in nature,
and . . . there is no other proof that the rules are good than the consensus extended to them by the experts.71

It should be no surprise that no peer-reviewed scientific journal
had published an article on scientific creationism at the time that
McLean was decided.72 It is not a scientific conspiracy that produced this result. As Foucault pointed out, it is the “political relations [that] have been established and deeply implanted in our
culture”—“the power relations that permeate the whole fabric of
our existence.”73 Even though reliance on both the materialistic
and the non-materialistic approach entails faith, there is great
risk in publishing something that runs so contrary to the norms
of the scientific community.

Id. at 1268.
Id.
Id. at 1272.
See supra notes 12–16, 64–68.
LYOTARD, supra note 12, at 29.
Since the time of this opinion, however, some peer-reviewed intelligent design literature has been published.
Although open hostility from those who hold to neo-Darwinism sometimes
makes it difficult for design scholars to gain a fair hearing for their ideas, research and articles supporting intelligent design are being published in peerreviewed publications. Examples of peer-reviewed books supporting design include The Design Inference (Cambridge University Press) by William Dembski,
and Darwin’s Black Box (The Free Press) by Michael Behe . . . .
Discovery Institute, Top Questions, http://www.discovery.org/csc/topQuestions.php (last
visited Oct. 8, 2006).
73 FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 17.
67
68
69
70
71
72
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C. Edwards v. Aguillard
In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court heard the case Edwards v.
Aguillard, and addressed whether the statute in question violated the Establishment Clause.74 The State of Louisiana passed
the Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and EvolutionScience in Public School Instruction Act (Creationism Act), which
prohibited public schools from teaching evolution science unless
accompanied by creation science.75 Public schools were not required to teach either evolutionism or creationism, but if a public
school wanted to teach one, the act required that it also teach the
other.76 The Supreme Court cited the Lemon Test as the legal
standard that it would use to determine the constitutionality of
the Creationism Act.77
The Court noted that it must consider some distinct issues
when applying the Establishment Clause to the unique context of
elementary and secondary public schools.78 Although the courts
should offer considerable deference to the decision-making of local school districts, they still must conform to the requirements of
the First Amendment.79 Courts must be particularly careful in
ensuring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools because parents entrust their children to these schools with the assumption that schools will not
advance religious views that conflict with the private beliefs of
the students and their families.80 There is great potential risk
because of the compulsory nature of education and the role that
teachers play as role models.81 The Court concluded that in “no
activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces
than in its schools.”82
The Court then looked to the first prong of the Lemon Test to
482 U.S. 578, 580–81 (1987).
Id. at 581.
Id.
Id. at 582–83; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text. “The Lemon test has
been applied in all cases since its adoption in 1971, except in Marsh v. Chambers . . . .
The Court based its conclusion in that case on the historical acceptance of the practice.”
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583 n.4.
78 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583–84 (“The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools.”).
79 Id. at 583.
80 Id. at 583–84 (“Families entrust public schools with the education of their children, but condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely
be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student
and his or her family.”).
81 Id. at 584 (“The State exerts great authority and coercive power through mandatory attendance requirements, and because of the students’ emulation of teachers as role
models and the children’s susceptibility to peer pressure.”).
82 Id. (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., opinion)).
74
75
76
77
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determine whether the actual purpose of the state was secular,
and held that the Creationism Act lacked a secular purpose.83
The stated purpose of the law was academic freedom, but it was
unclear whether this meant academic freedom for the teachers to
express or for the students to hear both sides of the issue.84 Regardless of how it was interpreted, the Act did not advance either
of these purposes.85 The Act did not advance the academic freedom of teachers since teachers had the freedom to teach alternatives to evolutionism prior to the passage of the Act.86 It did not
advance fairness for students for a number of reasons.87 It required development of curriculum guides for creationism but imposed no such requirement for evolutionism.88 The Act supplied
resource services for creationism that it did not supply for evolutionism.89 It prohibited schools from discriminating against anyone who taught creationism, but did not forbid discrimination
against anyone who taught evolutionism.90 The Court said that
the goal was not to expand the science curriculum, but rather to
discredit evolutionism by counter-balancing the teaching of evolutionism with creationism at every point.91
The Court also held that the Creationism Act had a religious
purpose because of the historical conflict between evolutionism
and the teachings of certain religious groups.92 The Court cited
the Epperson v. Arkansas case as evidence for its holding.93
Epperson involved a statute that prohibited the teaching of evolutionism,94 and the Court held that it was unconstitutional to
target and prohibit a single scientific theory about the origin of
life because it conflicts with the Biblical teachings of religious
groups.95 The Edwards Court concluded that the Creationism
Act advanced the religious view that a supernatural being created human beings.96 The primary purpose of the act was to advance a particular religious belief in violation of the First
Amendment.97 The Court finished its opinion with the rather
open-ended statement that “[w]e do not imply that a legislature
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id. at 585.
Id. at 586.
Id.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 588.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 590.
Id.; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
Epperson, 393 U.S. at 98.
Id. at 98, 106–07.
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 591–92.
Id. at 593.
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could never require that scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught.”98 However, the Court concluded that
the Creationism Act did not accomplish this with a secular purpose.99
The reasoning of the Court in Edwards is paradoxical. The
Court began its opinion by discussing the great injustice that
would occur if public schools indoctrinated students with beliefs
that conflict with their private beliefs.100 However, the Court
then concluded that the purpose of the Creationism Act was a
“sham” because the supporters of the Act were religious fundamentalists who opposed the indoctrination of their children with
evolutionary theory.101 One might question whether the Court
was opposed to the indoctrination of all students, or if, instead,
the Court was more concerned about the target of the indoctrination.
The Court did not follow the precedent that it established in
Epperson. The overriding concern of Epperson was one factor—
neutrality.102 The Epperson Court held that the Arkansas statute was unconstitutional because it was not neutral toward religion. The Court held:
Arkansas’ law cannot be defended as an act of religious neutrality.
Arkansas did not seek to excise from the curricula of its schools and
universities all discussion of the origin of man. The law’s effort was
confined to an attempt to blot out a particular theory because of its
supposed conflict with the Biblical account, literally read.103

The problem with the statute in Epperson was its lack of
neutrality. The government prohibited the teaching of a belief
because it conflicted with another belief. The Court explicitly
stated that Arkansas could have constitutionally prohibited all
teaching about the origin of life in public schools.104 The CreaId.
Id. at 594.
See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text.
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586–90 (“While the Court is normally deferential to a State’s
articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not a sham.”).
102 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“The First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.”).
103 Id. at 109.
104 Id. (“Arkansas’ law cannot be defended as an act of religious neutrality. Arkansas
did not seek to excise from the curricula of its schools and universities all discussion of the
origin of man.”). This is particularly interesting in light of the fact that the Court used a
statement of the sponsor of the Creationism Act, where he said that he would prefer that
schools not teach either creationism or evolutionism, as part of its reasoning for holding
that there was no secular purpose. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587 (“Senator Keith stated: ‘My
preference would be that neither [creationism nor evolution] be taught.’ Such a ban on
teaching does not promote—indeed, it undermines—the provision of a comprehensive sci98
99
100
101
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tionism Act at issue in Edwards achieved this neutrality since it
simply required that schools teach either both or none. The
Court’s holding in Edwards conflicted with the precedent set in
Epperson since Edwards prohibited communities from requiring
that science classes teach creationism with evolutionism.105
The Court also operated on the assumption that the mere inclusion of creationism with evolutionism in the curriculum is an
advancement of religion and an attempt to counterbalance and
discredit evolutionary theory at every point.106 Consider this scenario: A philosophy teacher at a public high school will only teach
proofs opposing the existence of God in his philosophy class, and
he refuses to teach any proofs supporting the existence of God because he believes that the concept of God is religious and not philosophical. Religious fundamentalist parents at the school express their outrage that this teacher is teaching their students an
atheistic belief system that is contrary to the Bible. Because of
outrage expressed by the religious parents, the school district
passes a policy requiring that teachers give equal time to proofs
supporting and opposing the existence of God. How could this
policy be constitutional under the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Edwards? The teacher, after all, was just teaching the students
philosophy, and religious parents do not have a right to counterbalance philosophical theories at every point with their personal
religious beliefs.107 The statute lacks a secular purpose since the
school only implemented the statute in reaction to outrage expressed by a specific religious sect,108 and including the proofs for
the existence of God would clearly advance the religious viewpoint that there is a God.109 It is simply incorrect to believe that
presenting both sides of an issue is somehow taking sides. Fairly
entific education.”) (citations omitted).
105 See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 97–98, 106–07. The Supreme Court used some language toward the end of the Edwards opinion that indicates that the Court is not foreclosing the possibility of teaching alternatives to evolution. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 593.
However, this is likely only an attempt by the Court to soften the impact of the opinion by
creating an impression of moderation that probably does not exist in practice. The reasoning that leads the Court to its holding in Edwards indicates that the exclusion of alternatives containing supernatural explanations is likely to be near absolute. Id. at 591–
93.
106 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 589 (“[T]he Act . . . has the . . . purpose of discrediting ‘evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of creationism . . . .’”) (quoting Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1985)); id. at 592
(“The legislative history documents that the Act’s primary purpose was to change the science curriculum of public schools in order to provide persuasive advantage to a particular
religious doctrine that rejects the factual basis of evolution in its entirety.”); id. at 593
(“The legislation therefore sought to alter the science curriculum to reflect endorsement of
a religious view that is antagonistic to the theory of evolution.”).
107 Id. at 589.
108 Id. at 590–92.
109 Id. at 592–93.
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presenting various perspectives on an issue is the essence of neutrality.
The Court did not even address the argument that it is important to present both sides of an issue. The Court sidestepped
this argument and cited other parts of the statute that it thought
were unfair.110 However, even if those other parts of the statute
were unfair, that still does not address the fairness of the statute’s most important provision, which is the requirement that
schools teach both or none. The Court’s concern about the unfairness of other parts of the statute is also unfounded because
those parts of the statute were remedial measures. This statute
was addressing a problem, which was the systematic exclusion of
creationism from science classes.111 The statute required the development of curricula for creationism because there was no such
curriculum in existence.112 The statute correctly assumed that a
curriculum dealing with evolutionism was already in existence.113
The statute also attempted to correct the specific problem of discrimination against creationists.114 Even if these remedial measures were unconstitutional, the Court should have merely struck
them down instead of using them to justify striking down the
more important parts of the statute that the legislature would
have wanted left in place.115 These remedial measures were tangential to the overriding purpose of the statute.

Id. at 588–89.
See id. at 630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Louisiana legislators had been told repeatedly that creation scientists were scorned by most educators and scientists, who
themselves had an almost religious faith in evolution.”).
112 Id. at 631.
In light of the unavailability of works on creation science suitable for classroom
use . . . and the existence of ample materials on evolution, . . . science teachers . . . would need a curriculum guide on creation science, but not on evolution,
and that those charged with developing the guide would need an easily accessible group of creation scientists.
Id. (citation omitted).
113 See id.
114 Id. at 630 (“It is hardly surprising, then, that in seeking to achieve a balanced,
‘nonindoctrinating’ curriculum, the legislators protected from discrimination only those
teachers whom they thought were suffering from discrimination.”).
115 The Supreme Court has held that
a court should refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary. . . . “[W]henever an act of Congress contains unobjectionable provisions
separable from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of this court to
so declare, and to maintain the act in so far as it is valid.”
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (quoting El Paso & Northeastern Ry. v.
Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909)). “Whether an unconstitutional provision is severable
from the remainder of the statute in which it appears is largely a question of legislative
intent, but the presumption is in favor of severability.” Id. at 653.
110
111
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D. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education
In 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heard
an Establishment Clause case that dealt with the Tangipahoa
Parish Board of Education’s requirement that teachers read a
disclaimer before the start of any unit that would deal with the
topic of evolutionary theory.116 The following statement was the
required disclaimer:
It is hereby recognized by the Tangipahoa Board of Education,
that the lesson to be presented, regarding the origin of life and matter,
is known as the Scientific Theory of Evolution and should be presented to inform students of the scientific concept and not intended to
influence or dissuade the Biblical version of Creation or any other concept.
It is further recognized by the Board of Education that it is the basic right and privilege of each student to form his/her own opinion and
maintain beliefs taught by parents on this very important matter of
the origin of life and matter. Students are urged to exercise critical
thinking and gather all information possible and closely examine each
alternative toward forming an opinion.117

The sole issue before the court was whether the disclaimer at
issue violated the First Amendment.118 The court concluded that
it would apply the Lemon Test to make this determination because it was the applicable law, even though it had been the subject of substantial criticism.119
The first question was whether the state action at issue had
a secular purpose under the first prong of the Lemon Test.120 The
school board offered three purposes for the statute: “(1) to encourage informed freedom of belief, (2) to disclaim any orthodoxy
of belief that could be inferred from the exclusive placement of
evolution in the curriculum, and (3) to reduce offense to the senFreiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1999).
Id. After the Fifth Circuit issued this opinion, the court acknowledged that it incorrectly quoted the disclaimer but denied a petition for rehearing en banc. Freiler v.
Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 201 F.3d 602, 603 (5th Cir. 2000). The following was the
correct disclaimer: “It is further recognized by the Board of Education that it is the basic
right and privilege of each student to form his/her own opinion or maintain beliefs taught
by parents on this very important matter of the origin of life and matter.” Id.
118 Freiler, 185 F.3d at 342.
119 Id. at 344. The court cited a recent Supreme Court decision, which applied the
Lemon Test to support its conclusion that the Lemon Test remains legally viable:
[T]he Supreme Court laid to rest rumors of the Lemon test’s demise . . . . The
Court acknowledged the continued viability of the general Lemon principles
used to evaluate whether government action violates the Establishment
Clause and noted in particular that the nature of the inquiry under Lemon’s
purpose prong has “remained largely unchanged.”
Id. (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997)). See also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
120 Freiler, 185 F.3d at 344.
116
117

359-390 TRASK.DOC

2006]

5/30/2007 10:30:28 PM

Evolution, Science, and Ideology

375

sibilities and sensitivities of any student or parent caused by the
teaching of evolution.”121 The court had to determine whether
the disclaimer furthered the stated purposes of the school
board.122 If the disclaimer furthered one articulated purpose and
that purpose was secular, the disclaimer would not violate the
secular purpose test.123 The court held that the disclaimer failed
to further freedom of belief because the disclaimer told students
that evolutionism did not have to affect what they already know,
and this violated the principle of critical thinking.124 The court
concluded that the disclaimer did further the other two stated
purposes of disclaiming orthodoxy and decreasing the offense of
parents,125 and the court held that these were both secular purposes.126
The court next had to determine whether the disclaimer conveyed a message of endorsement or approval in violation of the
second prong of the Lemon Test.127 The court held that the disclaimer primarily protected a particular religious belief, which
was the Biblical view of creation.128 Three factors in the disclaimer led the court to this conclusion:
(1) the juxtaposition of the disavowal of endorsement of evolution with
an urging that students contemplate alternative theories of the origin
of life; (2) the reminder that students have the right to maintain beliefs taught by their parents regarding the origin of life; and (3) the
“Biblical version of Creation” as the only alternative theory explicitly
referenced in the disclaimer.129

The court concluded that the disclaimer as a whole encouraged
students to meditate upon religion in general and the Biblical
narrative specifically.130 Although introducing religious concepts
in schools would not be prima facie unconstitutional, there is a
clear difference between comparative religion classes or history
classes and the disclaimer at issue,131 because the disclaimer
Id.
Id. (“In undertaking such a ‘sham’ inquiry, we consider whether the disclaimer
furthers the particular purposes articulated by the School Board or whether the disclaimer contravenes those avowed purposes.”) (citation omitted).
123 Id. (“If the disclaimer furthers just one of its proffered purposes and if that same
purpose proves to be secular, then the disclaimer survives scrutiny under Lemon’s first
prong.”).
124 Id. at 345.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 346 (“Lemon’s second prong asks whether, irrespective of the School Board’s
actual purpose, ‘the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval.’”) (quoting Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 817 (5th Cir.
1999)).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 347.
121
122
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does not provide understanding of different religions.132 The
court concluded that the disclaimer violated the second prong of
the Lemon Test and the Endorsement Test because it advanced
religion.133
The court in this case reached the correct holding for the
wrong reasons. It is acceptable (and in fact necessary) for schools
to teach alternatives to evolutionism in science classes because it
is important for schools to offer diverse perspectives on issues instead of just imposing one view on students. Teaching different
perspectives on the origins of life would not advance religion any
more than teaching the pro-life and pro-choice positions on abortion would somehow advance the pro-life position.134 If directly
teaching so-called religious alternatives in the curriculum would
not advance religion, then the infinitely more conservative step of
reading a disclaimer would surely not advance religion in the
way that the court describes. However, the school district may
have been advancing the religion of secular humanism through
its failure to teach alternatives as an actual part of the curriculum. If the disclaimer violated the Establishment Clause, it is
only because it did not go far enough in presenting actual alternatives to secular humanism in science classes.
E. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District
In 2005, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania heard Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District,
which involved a disclaimer about evolutionary theory that the
School District required teachers to read to students in ninthgrade biology classes.135 The court held that the disclaimer was
an unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause136 as it
failed both the Endorsement Test and the Lemon Test.137
There was one element of the court’s reasoning in this case
that was particularly significant. Like all of the previous court
Id.
Id. at 348.
The court explicitly states in its opinion that teaching comparative religion would
be acceptable. Id. at 347 (“[I]t might well be said that one’s education is not complete
without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to
the advancement of civilization.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)). Teaching evolution and its alternatives is no different from comparative religion, since both compare the religion of secular humanism
against others. The failure to recognize that science classes are currently advancing religion legitimizes the exclusion and indoctrination.
135 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
136 Id. at 764–65.
137 Id. at 765. Most of the court’s analysis centered on the facts of the specific disclaimer in this case, which is not particularly relevant to this article since such disclaimers are a much weaker version of what this article proposes.
132
133
134

359-390 TRASK.DOC

2006]

5/30/2007 10:30:28 PM

Evolution, Science, and Ideology

377

decisions that have dealt with evolutionism, the determining issue in this case was whether the alternative theory at issue was
a scientific theory.138 The court held that intelligent design is not
science.139 Intelligent design violates the rules of the scientific
discipline that have excluded the possibility of supernatural causation since the 16th and 17th centuries.140 Science intentionally
excludes questions relating to the meaning and purpose of the
world, and supernatural explanations are not scientific.141 “This
self-imposed convention of science, which limits inquiry to testable, natural explanations about the natural world, is referred to
by philosophers as ‘methodological naturalism’ and is sometimes
known as the scientific method.”142 The court reasoned that including supernatural explanations is a “science stopper” because
“once you attribute a cause to an untestable supernatural force, a
proposition that cannot be disproven, there is no reason to continue seeking natural explanations as we have our answer.”143
The court pointed out that every major scientific association that
has considered the question has concluded that intelligent design
is not science.144 The court, therefore, held that intelligent design
138 Id. at 738 (“[Intelligent Design’s] failure to meet the ground rules of science is sufficient for the Court to conclude that it is not science . . . .”); id. at 765 (“[T]he Board’s ID
Policy violates the Establishment Clause. In making this determination, we have addressed the seminal question of whether ID is science. We have concluded that it is not,
and moreover that ID cannot uncouple itself from its creationist, and thus religious, antecedents.”).
139 Id. at 735.
140 Id. The court’s conclusion is factually incorrect. The approaches of scientists to
the scientific method have been far more diverse than the court describes. Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727), one of history’s most important scientists, is an excellent example.
[S]cientists and historians are trying to reconcile the Isaac Newton they
thought they knew with the Isaac Newton they’re discovering in his private
papers.

....
Only recently made available to the public, at the National Library in Jerusalem, these documents are now revealing that for Newton, religion and science were inseparable, two parts of the same life-long quest to understand the
universe.
Newton himself wanted to design a universe in which God was absolutely
present and absolutely powerful. There’s an enormous irony there. In the 18th
century, gangs of interpreters, most of them French, will take the God out of
Newton’s world. It’s a very common image of what the Newtonian world was,
that it was soulless, that it was mechanical, that it really wasn’t theologically
motivated at all.
Now, ironically, that’s very anti-Newtonian, because Newton argued that
God had to be present, you couldn’t read him out of the universe.
NOVA: Newton’s Dark Secrets, (PBS television broadcast Nov. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/3217_newton.html.
141 See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 736.
144 Id. at 737.
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“fails to meet the essential ground rules that limit science to
testable, natural explanations.”145
The court only proves one truth through its reasoning in this
case. If one relies on an exclusively materialistic definition of
science, one will necessarily classify anything that is supernatural as unscientific. The question is whether there is any basis for
the presupposition that science must be exclusively materialistic
in its inferences. As has already been discussed, the materialistic conception of the scientific method entails as much faith as
the non-materialistic approach to the scientific method.146 Even
if every scientist on the planet endorsed the materialistic approach to the scientific method, it would not become any more
verifiable.
The court argued that allowing supernatural explanations
would be a “science stopper” since it would destroy the need to
search for natural explanations. This is logically untrue. The
materialistic approach to the scientific method allows for only
natural theories. The non-materialistic approach to the scientific
method allows for both natural theories and supernatural theories. Under the non-materialistic approach, people will be just as
free to search for natural explanations as they are under the materialistic approach. Both theories have the goal of increasing
knowledge about the sensible world. The existence of a supernatural theory will not stop people from searching for other possible natural theories. However, even if this were a risk, there is
an equal risk that the materialistic approach to the scientific
method could produce absurd theories in a desperate attempt to
find a materialistic explanation where no reasonable one exists.
Regardless of how one resolves these practical questions, it will
not implicate the ultimate position at issue here, which is that
belief in either approach to the scientific method requires faith.
The fact that a certain method appears to be practical does not
necessarily mean that it is true.
III. ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION AND SECULAR HUMANISM
The current precedents of the federal courts concerning the
teaching of evolutionism in public schools violate the Establishment Clause. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution says, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”147 The Lemon Test is the primary legal
standard that the federal courts have applied in recent evolution145
146
147

Id. at 738.
See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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ism cases to determine whether state actions violate the Establishment Clause.148 Therefore, the Lemon Test will be applied to
determine whether the failure to incorporate alternatives to evolutionary theory in public school science classes violates the Establishment Clause.
The Lemon Test requires that: “First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”149 The failure to include alternatives
to evolutionary theory is unconstitutional under the second prong
of the Lemon Test. The second prong of the Lemon Test requires
neutrality toward religion. In Epperson, the Court held:
Government . . . must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant
opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality
between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.150

Therefore, since neutrality is the legal standard, the issue
here is whether exclusively teaching evolutionism in science
classes is neutral toward religion.
Primary and secondary public education is a special setting
for the application of the Establishment Clause.151 When families place their children in the public education system, they expect that the school will not indoctrinate their children with belief systems that conflict with their own beliefs.152 Additionally,
the state exerts substantial coercive power with mandatory attendance requirements.153 Many families do not have the resources to seek out alternative educational arrangements for
their children. The unique setting of public education demands
elevated concern because of the risk of indoctrination that is in148 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582–83 (1987); McLean v. Ark. Bd. of
Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258 (D. Ark. 1982); Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ.,
185 F.3d 337, 344 (5th Cir. 1999); Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
149 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (citations omitted) (quoting
Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
150 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968); id. at 104 (“As early as 1872,
this Court said: ‘The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma,
the establishment of no sect.’”) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728
(1871)); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”).
151 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583–84.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 584.
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herent in public education.
The Supreme Court has established precedents that help determine when teaching religion in public schools is neutral. In
Zorach v. Clauson, the Court found that a state violates the principle of religious neutrality if it engages in religious instruction
that only represents the views of a particular sect.154 The Court
held in Epperson that the state violates the principle of neutrality if it tailors education to the principles or prohibitions of a particular religious group or dogma.155 On the other hand, in School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the Supreme Court
held that an education is incomplete without classes on the history of religion or comparative religion.156 Public schools can integrate study of the Bible and religion when presented objectively.157 The key principle for the Court is neutrality. Public
schools can educate students about religion, but they cannot side
with particular beliefs when educating about religion.
Secular humanism is a religion under the Establishment
Clause. The Supreme Court held in Epperson that the requirement of neutrality between different religious sects, and between
religion and nonreligion, is central to the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.158 The necessary implication of this principle is that the state cannot favor secular humanism over theistic
religious beliefs. The Supreme Court has held that secularism is
a religion in a few cases, including School District of Abington
Township.159 “We agree of course that the State may not estab343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to
force one or some religion on any person. . . . The government must be neutral
when it comes to competition between sects. It may not thrust any sect on any
person. . . . It may not coerce anyone to . . . take religious instruction.

154

Id.

155 Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106 (“There is and can be no doubt that the First Amendment does not permit the State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to
the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.”); id. at 106–07 (“It forbids
alike the preference of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed
antagonistic to a particular dogma.”).
156 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (“[O]ne’s education is not complete without a study of
comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of
civilization.”). The Court is not indicating here that schools cannot teach religion in science classes; it merely used religion classes as an example. What is important is the underlying principle, which says that it is perfectly fine to incorporate religion in public
school curriculum as long as the presentation is neutral.
157 Id. (“Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.”).
158 Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103–04.
159 374 U.S. at 225; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (“Among religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the
existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and oth-
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lish a ‘religion of secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus ‘preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.’”160 Additionally, a
long line of Supreme Court and Federal Circuit cases have held
that non-theistic beliefs like atheism fall within the definition of
religion under the First Amendment.161 Therefore, secular humanism is a religion under the First Amendment.
The exclusive teaching of evolutionary theory in public
schools is an advancement of the religion of secular humanism.
There is an inherent connection between evolutionary theory and
the secular humanist worldview. Secular humanists generally
reject knowledge that science cannot test.162 Since one cannot directly test the supernatural, secular humanists inevitably adopt
a naturalistic worldview, which is the belief that there is only a
natural realm and no supernatural.163 Any secular humanist
theory about the origin of life cannot rely on the supernatural because that would be inconsistent with naturalism. Therefore,
there is an inherent link between secular humanism and evolutionary theory because evolutionism is an exclusively materialistic theory about the origin of life.164
Some critics may question why teaching evolutionism would
advance secular humanism if some theistic religious groups also
believe in evolutionism.165 There are two answers. First, even if
ers.”). See also Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314 (“To hold that it may not would be to find in the
Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious
groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.”); id. (“But we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence.”); id. at 315 (“We cannot read into the Bill of Rights such
a philosophy of hostility to religion.”).
160 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., 374 U.S. at 225 (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314).
161 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–53 (1985) (“At one time it was thought that
this right merely proscribed the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would
not require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a
non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism. . . . [T]he Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all.”); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495
(“We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person ‘to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.’” (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 33 U.S. 1, 15 (1947))); Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 682
(7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Court has adopted a broad definition of ‘religion’ that includes nontheistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as theistic ones.”); Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330
F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003) (“‘[R]eligion’ includes antipathy to religion. . . . If we think
of religion as taking a position on divinity, then atheism is indeed a form of religion.”).
162 Council for Secular Humanism, supra note 31 (“We are skeptical of untested
claims to knowledge . . . .”).
163 Council for Secular Humanism, supra note 30 (“Secular humanists accept a world
view or philosophy called naturalism, in which the physical laws of the universe are not
superseded by non-material or supernatural entities . . . .”).
164 KURTZ, supra note 39, at 28.
165 See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 765 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
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it is possible for evolutionary theory to be consistent with the beliefs of some groups, science classes do not teach this form of evolutionism. Science classes generally teach evolutionism with no
supernatural element. Therefore, whether evolutionism can be
theoretically reconciled with religion is irrelevant since science
classes rarely teach that permutation of evolutionism and religion. Second, even if evolutionism, as taught in science classes,
complements the beliefs of some religious groups, there is still a
violation of the Establishment Clause, since the exclusive teaching of evolutionism would advance the beliefs of some Christian
religious denominations over the beliefs of other Christian religious denominations. The legal standard explicitly requires government neutrality between religious sects.166 Teaching evolutionary theory exclusively in public school science classes would
advance the religious beliefs of Christian religious groups that
believe in a non-literal interpretation of Genesis, and it would
discriminate against Christian religious groups that believe in a
literal interpretation of Genesis.
Some people may wonder why it is necessary to teach alternatives to evolutionism in science classes instead of in religion or
social studies classes. There are a few reasons. First, indoctrination in science classes is uniquely dangerous because of how the
norms of the scientific discipline mask its religious content. Only
directly teaching alternatives in science classes will make students aware of ideological content. Second, even if schools offered religion classes, they would likely not have the same status
as science classes since they would probably be electives instead
of required courses. Third, science teachers generally present
evolutionary theory as uncontested truth. It is unlikely that supernatural religious beliefs would get the same uncontested
status if taught in other classes. Fourth, the exclusion of supernatural theories from science classes marginalizes religious belief. It creates the impression that secular humanism is a practical device that allows people to understand the world today, and
religion is only an object of historical study concerning some de(“Both Defendants and many of the leading proponents of ID make a bedrock assumption
which is utterly false. Their presupposition is that evolutionary theory is antithetical to a
belief in the existence of a supreme being and to religion in general.”).
166 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”).
Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to
force one or some religion on any person. . . . The government must be neutral
when it comes to competition between sects. It may not thrust any sect on any
person. . . . It may not coerce anyone to . . . take religious instruction.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
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ranged people of the past. It also marginalizes religion by creating the implicit assumption that religion has nothing to say
about science. Fifth, would it be objectionable to teach the nonmaterialistic approach to the scientific method and creation science exclusively in science classes and to teach secular humanism in social studies? If there is truly no marginalization that
occurs through just teaching the materialistic scientific method
and evolutionism in science classes, then there should be no objection to a reversal of this situation.
A few cases have specifically addressed whether teaching
evolutionism exclusively in science classes violates the Establishment Clause, and all of the cases have held that it does not.
In 1972, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas heard Wright v. Houston Independent School District.167
The plaintiff sought an injunction that would prohibit the School
District and the State Board of Education from teaching evolutionism without critical analysis and alternative theories.168 The
plaintiffs argued that evolutionary theory was contrary to the
Bible, and that the uncritical presentation of evolutionism in science classes was, therefore, a direct attack on their religious beliefs by the state, which violated the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause.169 The plaintiffs argued that the state
was establishing a secular religion through its uncritical presentation of evolutionism,170 and that the teaching of evolutionism
was directly contrary to the principle of legal neutrality that the
Supreme Court established in Epperson.171
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim.172 Arkansas promoted religion by legislative means in Epperson, but there was
no official state or school district policy, which required that
teachers only teach evolutionism.173 The court did not think it
was significant that the textbooks had a bias in favor of evolutionism.174 “This Court has been cited to no case in which so
nebulous an intrusion upon the principle of religious neutrality
has been condemned by the Supreme Court.”175 There was no
evidence that students could not challenge their teacher’s presentation of evolutionism, and the law in Epperson prohibited dis-

167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175

366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
Id. at 1208.
See id. at 1209.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1210.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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cussion of evolutionism.176
The court concluded that that there was an insufficient connection between the First Amendment concept of religion and
evolutionism.177 Science and religion deal with similar issues
and sometimes have conflicting opinions, but the government
cannot prohibit ideas that are contrary to a particular religious
belief.178 Teachers cannot stop discussing every scientific issue
where a religion has a conflicting belief.179 Offering equal time to
all theories is not a solution to the problem. Every religion in the
world has a belief about the origin of life, and there is no way to
decide which theories to teach.180 The court concluded that the
proposed solutions would create more problems than they attempted to solve.181
There are a number of problems with the court’s analysis.
The court claimed that nothing in Epperson indicated that the
bias in this case was significant enough to justify holding it unconstitutional, but the Court in Epperson stated directly that a
“[s]tate may not adopt programs or practices in its public schools
or colleges which ‘aid or oppose’ any religion. This prohibition is
absolute.”182 Additionally, it is true that there was a legislative
action in Epperson, but there is no reason why a legislative action or school district policy is necessary. The quoted statement
above indicates that Epperson prohibits “practices,” and that
there could still be an unconstitutional state action even without
an official policy. The fact that the actions of the state of Arkansas were worse in Epperson than the actions of the Houston
School District does not make the actions of the Houston School
District constitutional since the prohibition against bias in education is absolute under Epperson.
The court argued that science and religion deal with similar
topics, and that the government cannot prohibit everything in
science that conflicts with religious beliefs.183 This statement
demonstrates yet again that courts justify the exclusion of alternative perspectives by masking secular humanism with scientific
discourse. Furthermore, if one assumes that an issue that comes
up in science class is a point of strong ideological disagreement
because it conflicts with religious beliefs, it would make sense to
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1211.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) (citation omitted) (emphasis

183

Wright, 366 F. Supp. at 1211.

added).
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include alternative perspectives on that issue.
The court stated that equal time is not feasible because there
are too many theories.184 Is there any other place in public education where this would be a legitimate excuse? A teacher could
not simply state: “We do not have time to teach both the pro-life
and pro-choice positions this semester so we are just going to
teach you the pro-choice perspective. After all, in the abortion
literature alone, there are at least thousands of different viewpoints on the issue.” This clearly does not justify failing to make
a good faith effort to include diverse perspectives. Maybe this
argument would be more credible if schools taught two perspectives instead of one. It is possible to offer students the big picture on these issues. There are many theories, but there are
common themes that schools can teach in a significantly more inclusive manner than singular indoctrination.
In 1980, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals heard Crowley v.
Smithsonian Institution.185 The appellants in that case filed a
civil action against the Smithsonian Institution in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia because the
Smithsonian presented two exhibits involving evolutionary theory.186 “The 1978 exhibit, the ‘Emergence of Man,’ is described in
an accompanying pamphlet as ‘the story of how, when and where
modern human beings evolved from homonid ancestors who lived
millions of years ago.’”187 The appellants argued that advocating
the theory of evolutionism was unconstitutional support for the
religion of secular humanism, and they requested an injunction
that would either prohibit funding for evolutionism or require
equal funding for Biblical creationism.188
The D.C. Circuit rejected the claim that the exhibits established a religion of secular humanism. Although the exhibits referred to evolutionism, they did not refer to evolutionism as the
only credible theory about the origin of life, nor did they mention
anything about religion or secular humanism.189 The exhibits did
nothing to disparage any religious belief.190 Even if evolutionary
theory relied on faith instead of scientific proof, as the appellants
claimed, that would not by itself prove that the evolutionism exhibits established a religion of secular humanism.191 One cannot
infer that anything one believes on faith is a religion simply be184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

Id.
636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id. at 740.
Id. at 741.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 741.
Id.
Id. at 742.
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cause some religions rely on faith.192 The involvement of the government in an area of importance to religious believers does not
mean that the activity is supporting a religion.193 For example,
government advocacy supporting or opposing abortion would not
establish a religion even though there are religious concerns at
stake in the issue.194 “[I]t does not follow that a statute violates
the Establishment Clause because it ‘happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.’”195 The court
also pointed to past precedents that support diffusion of scientific
knowledge and prohibit any special protection for religious
groups from the competition that comes from scientific information.196 The court affirmed the decision of the district court concluding that that the exhibits did not establish a religion of secular humanism.197
There are a few problems with the court’s reasoning in Crowley. The court states that even if evolutionism is unverifiable,
that alone does not make it a religious belief.198 This is true, but
evolutionism is a religion because it takes a position on an issue
that has always been at the center of religious belief systems, i.e.,
the origin of life and the universe. It is an advancement of religion when the government adopts a distinctly materialistic belief
about the origin of life that directly conflicts with other religious
beliefs. The court reasons that evolution is not a religion just because it coincides with the beliefs of secular humanism. However, there is a distinction between regulating morals and supporting doctrine. A state can prohibit murder, but a state cannot
coerce people into believing that murder is wrong because God
prohibits it. The Seventh Circuit has found that taking a position on divinity, whether affirming or denying, is itself a religious
belief.199 Similarly, taking a position on the origin of life is a religious belief regardless of the position that one takes since this issue is at the heart of religious belief.
The court arbitrarily creates a higher burden of proof in this
case for theistic religious belief than for non-theistic religious belief. In some federal cases, the courts have held that a mere refId.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
Id. at 744.
Id.
Id. at 742.
See Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Court has
adopted a broad definition of ‘religion’ that includes non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as
well as theistic ones.”); Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“‘[R]eligion’ includes antipathy to religion. . . . If we think of religion as taking a position
on divinity, then atheism is indeed a form of religion.”).
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
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erence “to creation out of nothing” is by itself an advancement of
religion, but the federal courts will not infer that a purely materialistic evolutionary process is an advancement of the religion of
secular humanism.200 In the context of theistic religion, mere
correlation is enough to prove a violation of the Establishment
Clause. In the context of non-theistic religion, only explicit endorsement is sufficient for the courts. The federal courts violate
the principle of religious neutrality when they require a higher
degree of proof to demonstrate an establishment of theistic religion than is required to demonstrate an establishment of secular
humanism.
In 1994, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard Peloza v.
Capistrano Unified School District.201 The plaintiff, a high school
biology teacher, sued the school district, arguing that evolutionism is a religion, and that forcing him to teach evolutionism was,
among other things, a violation of the Establishment Clause.202
He argued that evolutionism is a religion that relies on chance
instead of a creator to explain the origin of life.203 The court applied the Lemon Test to determine whether there was a violation
of the Establishment Clause.204 The court held that exclusively
teaching evolutionism does not establish a religion because the
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have never held that evolutionism or secular humanism are religions under the Establishment Clause, and the weight of the precedent and the dictionary definition are to the contrary.205 The court also stated
200 Compare Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591 (1987) (“The preeminent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a
supernatural being created humankind.”), and McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp.
1255, 1265 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (“The argument that creation from nothing in 4(a)(1) does not
involve a supernatural deity has no evidentiary or rational support. To the contrary,
‘creation out of nothing’ is a concept unique to Western religions. In traditional Western
religious thought, the conception of a creator of the world is a conception of God.”), and
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 718 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (“[A]nyone
familiar with Western religious thought would immediately make the association that the
tactically unnamed designer is God . . . .”), with Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist.,
37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Only if we define ‘evolution’ and ‘evolutionism’ as does
Peloza as a concept that embraces the belief that the universe came into existence without
a Creator might he make out a claim.”), and Crowley, 636 F.2d at 741 (“The concept of
evolution was referred to in these exhibits. . . . The exhibits did not mention religion in
general or Secular Humanism in particular. Neither by their terms nor by implication
did the exhibits disparage religion or any religious tenet.”), and Wright v. Houston Indep.
Sch. Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (“Plaintiffs’ case depends in large
measure upon their demonstrating a connection between ‘religion,’ as employed in the
first amendment, and Defendants’ approach to the subject of evolution. The Court is convinced that the connection is too tenuous a thread on which to base a first amendment
complaint.”).
201 37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994).
202 Id. at 519.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 520.
205 Id. at 521.
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that the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Edwards v. Aguillard
that evolutionism is not a religion.206 Finally, the court concluded that evolutionary theory is a scientific theory arrived at
through scientific study, and that it is not a religion.207
The court’s conclusion that secular humanism is not a religion under the Establishment Clause is problematic. After all, the
Supreme Court explicitly stated in two cases that secularism is a
religion,208 and held in two cases that atheism is a religion.209
The Ninth Circuit only cited two Federal Circuit cases in support
of its position, and neither case supports the court’s position.
The first case cited by the court was Smith v. Board of School
Commissioners.210 In Smith, the court concluded at the outset of
the case that it did not need to rule on whether secular humanism was a religion because the facts in that specific case could
not prove a violation of the Establishment Clause even if secular
humanism were a religion.211 The holding in Smith does not support the conclusion that secular humanism is not a religion.
The court’s second citation was to a quotation from Laurence
Tribe in United States v. Allen, which concluded that courts
Id.
Id. at 521–22.
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (“[T]he State
may not establish a ‘religion of secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus ‘preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do
believe.’” (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952))); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (“Among religions in this country which do not teach what
would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism,
Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others.”). See also Zorach, 343 U.S. 306, at 314
(“To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those
who believe in no religion over those who do believe.”); id. (“But we find no constitutional
requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to
throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence.”); id. at
315 (“We cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of hostility to religion.”).
209 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–53 (1985) (“At one time it was thought that
this right merely proscribed the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would
not require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a
non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism. . . . [T]he Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all.”); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495
(“We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person ‘to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.’” (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 33 U.S. 1, 15 (1947))).
210 Peloza, 37 F.3d at 521 n.5 (citing Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 827 F.2d 684, 690–
95 (11th Cir. 1987)).
211 See Smith, 827 F.2d at 689.
The Supreme Court has never established a comprehensive test for determining the “delicate question” of what constitutes a religious belief for purposes of
the first amendment, and we need not attempt to do so in this case, for we find
that, even assuming that secular humanism is a religion for purposes of the establishment clause, Appellees have failed to prove a violation . . . .
Id.
206
207
208
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should consider anything that is arguably non-religious to be not
a religion under the Establishment Clause.212 The court in Allen
stated that it did not even fully agree with the quotation from
Tribe, but in that case, the court found it helpful since the issue
was whether possession of nuclear weapons by the federal government was a religion.213 In light of all of the Supreme Court
precedent holding that both secularism and atheism are religions, it is difficult to understand how the Ninth Circuit reached
the conclusion that secular humanism is not a religion.
The Ninth Circuit also advanced a dictionary definition that
said that religion includes belief in the supernatural.214 Supreme
Court precedent clearly has more legal authority than Webster’s
Dictionary on the meaning of the First Amendment.215 In addition, if the Ninth Circuit had considered the implication of this
definition for situations beyond this single case, the court, without question, would not have advanced this definition. Making
belief in the supernatural the definition of religion would exclude
atheists and agnostics from the protection of the First Amendment since the First Amendment only protects the free exercise
of religion.216
The court also pointed to the holding of Edwards v. Aguillard to support its conclusion that evolutionism is not a religion
under the First Amendment.217 However, the court failed to cite
a specific page number in Edwards that supports this conclusion.218 The reason that the court could not cite a particular page
is that the Supreme Court never specifically addressed the issue
of whether evolution is a religion. However, the Ninth Circuit
may have assumed that it was implied in Edwards. In any case,
it is ultimately irrelevant whether Edwards held that evolution212 Peloza, 37 F.3d at 521 n.5 (citing United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 450–51 (2d
Cir. 1985)).
213 See Allen, 760 F.2d at 450–51 (“Although we need not follow him to that extreme
in this opinion—supporting nuclear armaments being a good deal more than ‘arguably’
non-religious—we find his analysis helpful and provocative.”).
214 Peloza, 37 F.3d at 521 n.4 (“According to Webster’s, religion is the ‘belief in and
reverence for a supernatural power accepted as the creator and governor of the universe.’”).
215 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
216 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). Note that the word religion is
used only once in the First Amendment, which means that it would be nearly impossible
to arrive at different definitions of religion for the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses. Therefore, the logical implication of the court’s dictionary definition is that it
would be constitutional to pass laws prohibiting atheism and agnosticism.
217 Peloza, 37 F.3d at 521 (“The Supreme Court has held unequivocally that while the
belief in a divine creator of the universe is a religious belief, the scientific theory that
higher forms of life evolved from lower forms is not.”) (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578 (1987)).
218 Id.
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ism is not a religion since the Supreme Court should overturn
Edwards by holding that failure to teach alternatives to evolutionism violates the Establishment Clause.
CONCLUSION
The public education system and the courts have systematically excluded alternatives to evolutionary theory from public
school science classes. The primary rationale for excluding alternatives to evolutionism is the idea that supernatural religious beliefs do not belong in science classes because they are unscientific. This reasoning is nothing more than a façade because the
materialistic scientific method that legitimizes the exclusion of
alternatives to evolutionary theory is just as unverifiable as belief in the supernatural. The hegemony of the materialistic approach to the scientific method has allowed the religion of secular
humanism to flourish in public school science classes under the
mask of scientific objectivity. Only recognition of the faith-based
assumptions that are inherent in both the materialistic and nonmaterialistic scientific methods will create the possibility of ending the unjust indoctrination that is plaguing public schools.
Teaching evolutionism without alternative theories in public
school science classes advances and establishes the religion of
secular humanism. The legal standard is neutrality, and excluding alternatives to evolutionism could not be a more explicit violation of this standard. The state is compelling students to attend science classes that engage in religious instruction.
Epperson is the only evolutionism case that reached the right
holding for the right reason. The Court correctly held that neutrality toward religion was the standard, and a statute that prohibited the teaching of evolutionism was not neutral, which
proves that the true constitutional standard is to teach either all
or none. Subsequent federal court cases, which have dealt with
the issue of evolutionism, violate the principle of neutrality contained in the Lemon Test because they have the effect of advancing the religion of secular humanism.

